Habermas on Virtue :: Ethics Morals Papers

Habermas on VirtueAlthough Habermas has never worked out a conception of virtue and and then criticizes this notion whenever he uses it, his theory crucially depends on the virtuous mental attitude of participants in hold forth be it in the realm of democracy and right or that of morality. In this paper, in which I deal only with the honourable foundations of morality, I argue first that the norms of discourse which are gained from a presuppositional outline of speech as such ask to be complemented by the in the buff perception on the side of the recipients. Only when the claims are understood in their full significance for the speaker does the discourse live up to the sublime which is already anticipated in every speech act. This presuppositional analysis shows second that it is mainly the virtuous attitude that is morally relevant and not those capacities for playacting morally that the agent already possesses. However, the virtuous attitude authentically entails the engagement to strive to perfect all those capacities that enable us to sensitively agnise the others claim. A discussion of the (discursive) capacities that have to be promoted leads to the singling out of sensitivity as contrasted to immediate empathy. It is the reflexive transcendence of the agents evaluative patterns that allows this emotion to sit intumesce with a post-conventional morality. Finally, I discuss a possible caveat of Wellmer and Habermas who great power claim that the proposed conception of virtue would only be valid for participants in discourse, still not for agents acting in the life-world. However, because the discursive virtue is of liberal latitude, it does not fall under this objection. The last several years have seen an impressive revival of interest in the concept of virtue. In contrast, the discourse ethics of Jrgen Habermas seems to be especially inadequate to account for the ethical significance of virtue, because by emphasizing intersubjective p rocedures it plays down the importance of individual qualities. In fact, Habermas uses the term virtue rarely, and where he does use it, he criticizes it harshly for presupposing a share conception of the good life. (1) However, as I will argue in this paper, there is a conception of deontological virtue which is not only compatible, but indispensable for Habermass theory. Thus, although he attempts to externalize virtue as much as possible into procedures, discourse ethics has to presuppose that the participants possess a genuinely virtuous attitude.